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THE NEW YORK PROPOSED CODE OF EVIDENCE:
ARTICLE V
Michael M. Martin*
Article V of the New York Proposed Code of Evidence sets
forth the rules of evidentiary privilege. Unlike other articles of
the Proposed Code, it differs significantly from its federal
counterpart.'
Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence consists of only
rule 501, which provides that, unless otherwise required by the
constitution or federal statute, privileges in federal courts are
governed by "the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted... in the light of reason and experience."2 Rule 501
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law. BA. 1963; JD. 1966, University of
Iowa; B.IL 1968, Oxford University. Consultant, New York State Law Revision Com-
mission project preparing the Proposed Code of Evidence. The author gratefully ac-
knowledges the assistance of Robert Slingsby, Fordham Law School class of 1982, in
preparing this Article for publication.
1 The Federal Rules of Evidence as drafted by the Advisory Committee and pre-
scribed by the United States Supreme Court contained detailed provisions regarding
privileges. PROPOSED FED. R. Evn. 501-513, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972). Those
provisions, however, became the focus of substantial controversy and resistance in Con-
gress. See generally 2 J. WmrNSTm & M% BERGER, EvrDEzc 1501101] (1981) [hereinafter
cited as WEmsTEs'S EvWDENCE]. Some thought elimination of the doctor-patient privi-
lege and its replacement by a psychotherapist privilege too radical. Id. I 504[011, at 504-
12 & n.4; see PRoPosED FED. R. Evw. 504; notes 76-82 and accompanying text infra.
Others were concerned in those days of Watergate about the official information privi-
lege. 2 WF Nsm'S EvmENcE 509-3 to 509-4. And many expressed doubts about applying
federal privilege rules to the diversity cases in federal courts, which are of course based
on state law. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess 8-9 (1973), reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7082-83 [hereinafter cited as HouSE REPor No.
650]. It was apparent that no accord could be reached concerning the controversial privi-
lege rules. See, e.g., SEN. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & A. NEws 7051, 7053. Rather than attempt a redrafting of the pro-
posals to express its views on the policies involved in the various privileges, Congress
adopted a single rule to cover the subject. FED. R. Evm. 501.
2Rule 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or pro-
vided by Act of Congress or in the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
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further provides, however, that questions of privilege in civil
cases as to which state law supplies the rule of decision will be
governed by state law.3 Thus, an examination of Article V of the
New York Proposed Code is useful not only because of its signif-
icance in state cases, but also because of its relevance to federal
diversity cases.
AN OVERVMW OF ARTICLE V
The privileges sections are the most broadly applicable of
the Proposed Code's provisions. They apply "at all stages of all
[judicial] actions, cases, and proceedings,"'4 as well as in all other
proceedings in which "testimony can be compelled to be given.' 5
Thus, the privileges apply to pretrial hearings and to legislative,
administrative, and arbitration hearings, as well as to trials.6
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State Law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
A recent illustration of the application of this provision is Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), in which the Supreme Court held that the spousal privilege in
a criminal case belongs only to the witness-spouse and not to the party-spouse. Id. at 47-
53. The decision marked a departure from the prior rule, which had vested the privilege
in either spouse. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958). Although the Hawkins
Court had rejected a Government challenge to the privilege and a suggestion that it be
modified in much the same way as was later adopted in Trammel, the Trammel Court
noted that support for the general privilege had steadily eroded since Hawkins. 445 U.S.
at 48-50. Furthermore, the rationale for the privilege articulated in Hawkins, the state's
reluctance to encourage testimony that would alienate the spouse "or further inflame
domestic differences," 358 U.S. at 79, was "unpersuasive" according to the Trammel
Court. "When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding
- whatever the motivation - their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is
probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve." 445 U.S. at
52. In Trammel the Court circumvented 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976), which requires new
privilege rules prescribed by the Court to be approved by Congress. The Court said its
result was a federal common-law development, and not the prescription of a new privi-
lege, so it was not within the "Court's statutory rule making authority" which is limited
by § 2076. 445 U.S. at 47 n.8 (emphasis in original).3 The Advisory Committee had concluded that Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), and its progeny did not mandate this result. Proposed FED. R. EVID. 501, Advi-
sory Comm. Note (relying on Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)).4 N.Y. PROPOSED CODE EVID. § 101(e) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED CODE]. See
also id. §§ 101(c), 501(b).
5 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 501(b)(i). The Proposed Code does not purport to
prescribe the scope of privileges granted outside of it. See id. § 501(b).
6 Id. § 501(b)(i). This provision was included in article V because § 101, the provi-
sion setting forth the general applicability of the Proposed Code, refers only to judicial
[Vol. 47:1339
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The Proposed Code neither creates any new privileges nor
totally eliminates any existing ones. Rather, it restates--with
some modifications in language, and less often, in substance-
the privileges currently provided for in New York's Civil Prac-
tice Law and Rules (CPLR): the privilege for confidential
spousal communications;7 the attorney-client privilegef the so-
cial worker-client privilege;9 and doctor, nurse, dentist, and psy-
chologist-patient 0 privileges. The only privilege in the CPLR
which has not been restated in the Proposed Code is the self-
incrimination privilege;" as a firmly established constitutional
privilege it need not be codified. 2 In addition, the Proposed
Code incorporates several privileges developed by the courts: the
privileges against disclosure of political votes,13 trade secrets,14
secrets of state and official information,15 and informants' iden-
tity.16 Notably, adoption of the Proposed Code would preclude
courts from creating new privileges, 17 although a court will be
proceedings rather than to all situations in which testimony can be compelled. The con-
sultants feared that the assurance of a privilege in only judicial proceedings would be an
insufficient "inducement to free communication" if disclosure could be required in ad-
ministrative, legislative, or other types of hearings. Id. § 501, Commentary.
The current attorney-client privilege contains a broad applicability provision simil
to that of the Proposed Code. Compare N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 403(a) (McKinney 1963)
(CPLR) with PnoposED CODE, supra note 4, § 501(b). The CPLR provision was added as
a response to the decision in Lanza v. New York State Joint Legis. Comm., 3 N.Y.2d 92,
99, 143 N.E_2d 772, 776, 164 N.Y.S.2d 9, 14, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 856 (1957).
7 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4502(b) (McKinney 1963). See notes 111-23 and accompa-
nying text infra.
8 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4503 (McKinney 1963). See text accompanying notes 37-66
infra.
I N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). See notes 105-10 and
accompanying text infra.
10 N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. LAw §§ 4504, 4507 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). See notes 67-
104 and accompanying text infra.
n N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 4501 (McKinney 1963).
1' See U.S. CONsT. amend. V; N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6. See generally In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); People ex rel. Taylor v. Forbes, 143
N.Y. 219, 228 (1894).
13 See notes 132-33 and accompanying text infra.
' See notes 134 & 138-50 and accompanying text infra.
156 See notes 135 & 141-44 and accompanying text infra.
16 See notes 136 & 154-69 and accompanying text infra.
17 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 501(a). The Proposed Code precludes the judici-
ary from creating new privileges because "most privileges reflect the kind of accommoda-
tion of important competing interests that should be left to the [legislature]." Id., Com-
mentary. Recognition of privileges with constitutional bases could, of course, continue.
See In re A & M, 61 App. Div. 2d 426, 429-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378-81 (4th Dep't 1978)
1981]
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able to protect the confidentiality of particular statements or
documents.18
Section 501 of the Proposed Code incorporates by reference,
but does not otherwise affect, privileges granted by the constitu-
tions or laws of the United States or the State of New York.19
Thus, for example, the self-incrimination 20 and journalist 21 privi-
leges and the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings2 would
be unchanged by the Proposed Code.2
(parent-child privilege); People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup.
Ct. Westchester County 1979) (same).
'8 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 501(a). The Commentary notes that confidential-
ity is sometimes ordered as a condition of disclosure or in relation to an affidavit ex-
changed as part of a plea bargaining procedure. Id., Commentary.
19 Id. § 501(a).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
21 New York Civil Rights Law § 79-h(b) provides an exemption from liability for
contempt of court in favor of professional journalists and newscasters:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any general or specific law to the contrary,
no professional journalist or newscaster presently or having previously been
employed or otherwise associated with any newspaper, magazine, news agency,
press association, wire service, radio or television transmission station or net-
work or other professional medium of communicating news or information to
the public shall be adjudged in contempt by any court, the legislature or other
body having contempt powers, nor shall a grand jury seek to have a journalist
or newscaster held in contempt by any court, legislature or other body having
contempt powers for refusing or failing to disclose any news or the source of
any such news coming into his possession in the course of gathering or ob-
taining news for publication or to be published in a newspaper, magazine, or
for broadcast by a radio or television transmission station or network or for
public dissemination by any other professional medium or agency which has as
one of its main functions the dissemination of news to the public, by which he
is professionally employed or otherwise associated in a news gathering capacity
notwithstanding that the material or identity of a source of such material or
related material gathered by a person described above performing a function
described above is or is not highly relevant to a particular inquiry of govern-
ment and notwithstanding that the information was not solicited by the jour-
nalist or newscaster prior to disclosure to him.
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). See Apicella v. McNeil
Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); In re WBAI-FM v. Proskin, 42 App.
Div. 2d 5, 344 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dep't 1973).
22 N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 190.25(4) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981) prohibits any
grand juror, district attorney, clerk, public servant, stenographer, or interpreter from dis-
closing the nature or substance of any grand jury testimony, decision or result, except in
the lawful discharge of duties or upon written order of the court. See also J. PRINCE,
RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE, § 408, at 400 (10th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
RICHARDSON].
2" The protections against disclosure in pre-trial discovery proceedings afforded to
an attorney's work product, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3101(c) (McKinney 1970), and to
material prepared for litigation, id. § 3101(d), are also unchanged by the Proposed Code.
[Vol. 47:1339
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The Code, in section 502, protects from disclosure reports or
returns required by federal or state laws,2' if the law requiring
the report or return to be made accords it confidentiality.2 5
Thus, for example, a required accident report, which the state
where it was made treats as confidential in order to protect
against self-incrimination and to encourage full disclosure, will
be treated as privileged in New York.26
The traditional view in this country toward privileges has
been that they are justified because, and only to the extent that,
they encourage communications considered important by the so-
ciety.27 Because privileges also keep relevant information from
the trier of fact, courts have tended to interpret the privileges
narrowly.28
24 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 502 provides:
A person, corporation, association, or other organization or entity, either public
or private, making a return or report required by the laws of the United States
or of any state to be made has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent
any other person from disclosing the return or report, if the law requiring it to
be made so provides. A public officer or agency to whom a return or report is
required by law to be made has a privilege to refuse to disclose the return or
report if the law requiring it to be made so provides. No privilege exists under
this section in actions involving perjury, false statements, fraud in the return
or report, or other failure to comply with the law in question.
Examples of statutes which require reports or returns and which provide privileges
against disclosure (including prohibitions against disclosure by the official recipient) in-
clude N.Y. AGRIC. & lmxs. LAw § 233 (McKinney 1972) and N.Y. PUB. HALT Lw §
2221 (McKinney 1977). Statutes containing this kind of provision enjoy the protection of
§ 501(a) of the Proposed Code. PRoPosED CODE, supra note 4, § 502, Commentary.
PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 502.
28 Id., Commentary.
" Dean Wigmore theorized that four fundamental conditions must exist in order to
justify granting a privilege against disclosure:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfac-
tory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relations by the disclosure of the com-
munications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of the litigation.
8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961). This view op-
posed expanding privileges to include additional classes of persons, RIcHARsoN, supra
note 22, § 409, at 403, and endorses the curtailment of existing privileges. See 8 J. Wic-
mORE, supra, § 2286, at 536.
28 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); Prink v. Rockefeller
Center, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 309, 317, 398 N.E.2d 517, 522, 422 N.Y.S.2d 911, 916 (1979).
19811
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Increasingly, commentators and courts have questioned the
traditional restrictive view of privileges.2 A theory of privileges
has emerged that focuses on their symbolic value"0 as means by
which society protects basic individual interests in privacy and
dignity.31 Although the traditional instrumental approach is still
very influential, this newer approach provides the theoretical
underpinning for some of the Proposed Code's provisions. Thus,
privacy and dignity considerations prompted a change in the
common law rule which permitted an eavesdropper to testify to
otherwise privileged information; 2 under section 501 such testi-
mony would be barred.33 Similarly, the Proposed Code explicitly
gives the right to claim or waive a privilege for communications
between a professional and her client or patient to the client or
patient, rather than to the professional. 4 Finally, this newer,
29 See, e.g., Prink v. Rockefeller Center, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 309, 322, 398 N.E.2d 517,
524, 422 N.Y.S.2d 911, 919 (1979) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting in part); C. McConMICK's
HANDBOOK or THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 77 (2d ed. E. Cleary ed. 1972); Krattenmaker,
Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61 (1973); Lousell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confu-
sion: Privileges in Federal Courts Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101 (1956).
30 For example, few would argue that patients seeking treatment of physical condi-
tions would stop confiding in their doctors in the absence of such a privilege. See notes
83-86 and accompanying text infra. Rather, it is the symbolic value of such communica-
tions which society seeks to protect. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 2380a, at 829-30.
Similarly, it is unlikely that husbands would stop confiding in their wives if there were
no testimonial privilege. See id. § 2332, at 642-43. See notes 114-15 & 121-23 and accom-
panying text infra.
21 Cary v. White, 59 N.Y. 336, 339 (1874); Erlich v. Erlich, 278 App. Div. 244, 104
N.Y.S.2d 531 (1st Dep't 1951); Sparer v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 185 App. Div. 861, 173
N.Y.S. 673 (1st Dep't 1919).
2 See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 29, § 75, at 154; Lanza v. New York State Joint
Legislative Comm., 3 N.Y.2d 92, 143 N.E.2d 772, 164 N.Y.S.2d 9, cert, denied, 355 U.S.
856 (1957).
32 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 501(b)(ii) & Commentary. At present, the only
statutory provision explicitly barring eavesdropper testimony is in the attorney-client
privilege. N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. LAW § 4503 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). A question exists
regarding the applicability of Proposed Code § 501(b)(ii) to the spousal privilege con-
tained in § 505(b). It is not clear whether, under § 505, the communication between
spouses is itself privileged, in which case § 501(b)(ii) would bar the testimony of an
eavesdropper to that communication, or whether the spouses are incompetent to be ex-
amined regarding confidential communications, in which case § 501(b)(ii) would not ap-
pear to be applicable. Arguably, to the extent that the bar against eavesdropper testi-
mony is essential to promote society's concerns with dignity and privacy, the bar should
be applied even if the spousal provision in § 505(b) is subsequently interpreted merely as
a rule of competence.
34 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, §§ 503(c), 504(c), 506(c), 511(c). Under current
New York law, the physician-patient and social worker-client privileges can, under cor-
[Vol. 47:1339
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less restrictive view is manifested in the provisions which require
only that the client or patient "reasonably believe" the profes-
sional is authorized to practice35 and which permit the authori-
zation to be from any state or nation. 6
I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGES
Section 503 of the New York Proposed Code of Evidence
provides that confidential communications between lawyer and
client in the course of seeking or rendering professional legal ser-
vices may not be disclosed over the client's objection, unless the
communication is subject to one of six enumerated exceptions. 7
Section 503(a) states that "[a] communication is 'confiden-
tial' if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than
those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition
of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the communication."3 8 This
definition does not significantly alter the meaning of "confiden-
tial communication" from that applied under current law.39
The Proposed Code makes no attempt to resolve the issue
of which employees of a corporate client may make privileged
tain circumstances, be claimed or waived by the professional. N.Y. Civ. PR c. Lw §§
4504, 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). See 5 J. WFINSTEIN, IL KORN & A. Mn1sn,
NEW YORK CIvIL PRACTICE T 4504.09, at 45-203 to 45-205 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
CIVIL PRACTICE].
PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, §§ 503(a)(2), 504(a)(2), 506(a)(1), 511(a)(2). See
RICHARDSON, supra note 22, § 412, at 406.
36 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, §§ 503(a)(2), 504(a)(2)-(5).
-1 Id. § 503(d) provides six exceptions which will permit the disclosure of otherwise
privileged communications: (1) furtherance of crime or fraud; (2) breach of duty by a
lawyer;, (3) joint clients; (4) law guardians in child protection proceedings; (5) public of-
ficer or agency; and (6) transfer of property interest by deceased client. Both § 503 of the
Proposed Code and N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 4503 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1931) provide
that confidential communications between an attorney and client are privileged unlec3
the privilege is waived by the client. Unlike the Proposed Code, the CPLR establishes no
exceptions to this general rule except in an action involving the construction, probate, or
validity of a will Id. § 4503(b). The other exceptions have developed as a judicial glos3
on the statute.
PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 503(a).
!9 See id., Commentary, which states that § 503(a) is in accord with New York case
law (citing Kent Jewelry Corp. v. Kiefer, 202 Misc. 778, 113 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1952)). See also People v. Roach, 215 N.Y. 592, 602, 190 N.E. 618, 623-24
(1915); Doheny v. Lacy, 168 N.Y. 213, 223.24, 61 N.E. 255, 258 (1901); Lelong v.
Siebrecht, 196 App. Div. 74, 187 N.Y.S. 150 (2d Dep't 1921); RICHARDSON, supra note 22,
§§ 413-14, at 408-09.
19811
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confidential communications to the corporation's attorney; the
question has been left for case-law development.40 The Supreme
Court's recent decision in Upjohn Co. v. United States41 may
provide some guidance in this area, however. In Upjohn, the
Court rejected the "control group" test,42 which restricted the
privilege to communications between the attorney and employ-
ees who hold decision-making positions as to the matters for
which the attorney's advice was sought.43 Without precisely de-
fining the scope of the privilege, the Court stated that uninhib-
ited communications from a larger class of employees than was
embraced under the control group test would be necessary so the
40 The consultants chose to leave this issue unresolved in hopes of avoiding the criti-
cism directed against the drafters of the Federal Rules when they attempted to define
the scope of the corporate privilege in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. PRO-
POSED CODE, supra note 4, § 503, Commentary. The first draft of proposed federal rule
503 conformed to the then recent trend in the federal courts of applying the attorney.
client privilege only to communications between the attorney and those in the "control
group" of the corporation. See Natta v. Hoga, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968); Bur-
lington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 35 (D. Md. 1974); Congoleum Indus., Inc. v,
GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 85 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F.
Supp. 515, 518 (S.D. Cal. 1963); American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F.
Supp. 85, 89 (D. Del. 1962); City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F.
Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), pet. for mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom., General
Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 942 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 943 (1963).
Thus, the draft of federal rule 503 accorded the privilege to communications between a
representative of a client and a lawyer and defined a client's representative as "one hav-
ing authority to obtain legal services and to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on
behalf of the client." PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 503, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972). At
the time the final proposed rule was drafted, however, the control-group test was under
attack as being unresponsive to the realities of corporate life, for failing to insure pro-
dictability, and for impairing the values the privilege was designed to protect. See 2
WENSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 1, 1 503(b)[04], at 503-46. In 1970, the Seventh Cir-
cuit rejected the control group test and held that the privilege would attach if the em-
ployee made the communication at the direction of his corporate superiors and if the
subject matter of the communication involved the employee's performance of his em-
ployment. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970),
aff'd, 400 U.S. 955 (1971) (4-4). 2 WEINSTaN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 1, 1 503(b)[04], at
503-47. Realizing that it would be impossible to draft a rule satisfactory to a majority of
the Justices, the Advisory Committee amended the rule by eliminating the definition of"representative of the client." It did not remove the phrase from the body of the general
rule of privileges, however, and thus construction of the term rests with the courts.
41 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
42 Id. at 397. See generally Feld, Supreme Court in Upjohn Protects Attorney-Cli-
ent Privilege; Upholds the Work-Product Doctrine, 54 J. TAX 210 (1981); Stern, Attor-
ney-Client Privilege: Supreme Court Repudiates the Control Group Test, 67 A.B.A. J.
1142 (1981); Comment, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Alternatives to the
Control Group Test, 12 Tx. TECH. L. REv. 459 (1981).
4S For cases employing the "control group" test, see note 40 supra.
[Vol. 47:1339
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attorney could give sound advice and proper representation to a
corporate client."
Section 503(b) specifies the communications to which the
privilege applies, by referring to the parties involved. This provi-
sion effects no change in the present law, but it does clarify the
applicability of the privilege to situations in which multiple par-
ties have separate attorneys representing them in a matter of
common interest.45 The Proposed Code explicitly extends the
privilege to communications between any of the clients and any
of the attorneys in those situations, implicitly recognizing the"community of interest" theory upon which some courts had
previously relied in applying the privilege."
The Proposed Code provides that the attorney-client privi-
lege belongs to the client or his representative, even though it
may be claimed on the client's behalf by the client's present law-
yer or the lawyer at the time of the communication. 4'7 If no per-
son entitled to claim the privilege is present to do so, the court
may exercise its discretion to protect the client's interest and
prevent disclosure.'8
While the Proposed Code does not change current law as to
exceptions -for communications in furtherance of a crime,4  or
" 449 U.S. at 393. Chief Justice Burger, concurring, suggested that the communica-
tion should be privileged when:
an employee or former employee speaks at the direction of the management
with an attorney regarding conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of
employment. The attorney must be one authorized by the management to in-
quire into the subject and must be seeking information to assist counsel in
performing any of the following functions: (a) evaluating whether the em-
ployee's conduct has bound or would bind the corporation; (b) nessing the
legal consequences, if any, of that conduct; or (c) formulating appropriate legal
responses to actions that have been or may be taken by others with regard to
that conduct.
Id. at 403.
4 Courts have been divided on the question of the availability of the attorney-client
privilege for communications made by one party to his co-party's lawyer. Compare In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 406 F. Supp. 381, 386, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) with
Styx Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 47 F.R.D. 334, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
and Leonia Amusement Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 438, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (dictum).
4' See PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 503(b)(3).
47 Id. § 503(c).
48 Id. Allowing the judge to invoke the privilege on behalf of an absent party com-
ports with the trend toward applying privileges in the interests of privacy and confiden-
tiality, see note 29-31 and accompanying text supra, rather than the traditional
Wigmorean "instrumental" approach. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
49 PRoPosED CODE, supra note 4, § 503(d)(1). The Proposed Code restate3 existing
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relevant to a breach of duty by the lawyer,50 it does incorporate
other significant changes from current law in the exceptions sub-
division of section 503. For example, while the traditional rule
has been that the attorney-client privilege does not apply when
joint clients of one attorney later sue each other,5 1 the Proposed
Code lifts the privilege in such actions only when the lawyer has
specifically advised the joint clients that their joint consultation
constitutes a waiver.5 2 The theory of the traditional rule is that
as joint clients, client A could not have intended to keep a secret
from client B.53 In reality, as the Proposed Code recognizes, it
seems more likely that when client A spoke to the lawyer in cli-
ent B's absence, client A did not expect anyone, including B, to
be able to compel disclosure over A's objection. 4
Section 503(d)(4) of the Proposed Code creates a new ex-
ception to the attorney-client privilege: statements to a lawyer
acting as a law guardian in child protective proceedings"5 are not
privileged.56 This provision is analogous to the current excep-
tions in the CPLR to the physician 57 and social worker privi-
law by denying a privilege for communications in "furtherance of crime or fraud." Id. §
503(d)(1). See People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of the County Jail, 150 Misc. 714,
719-20, 270 N.Y.S. 362, 369-70 (Sup. Ct. New York County), affd, 242 App. Div. 611, 271
N.Y.S. 1059 (1st Dep't 1934); Fontana v. Fontana, 194 Misc. 1042, 87 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Fai.
Ct. Richmond County 1949); CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 34, 4503.13, at 45-134.
60 As published, § 503(d)(2) of the Proposed Code would change existing law, see In
re Metrik, 19 App. Div. 2d 34, 36, 240 N.Y.S.2d 443, 444-45 (1st Dep't 1963); Glines v.
Baird's Estate, 16 App. Div. 2d 743, 227 N.Y.S.2d 71 (4th Dep't 1962), but this is merely
the result of a drafting error that will be corrected prior to submission of the Proposed
Code to the New York State Legislature. See PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 503(d)(2),
Commentary.
51 See Shafer v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 248 App. Div. 279, 287, 289 N.Y.S. 577, 559
(4th Dep't 1936); Myers v. Brick, 146 App. Div. 197, 201, 130 N.Y.S. 910, 913 (4th Dep't
1911); Holmes v. Bloomingdale, 72 App. Div. 627, 76 N.Y.S. 182, 184-85 (3d Dep't 1902).
See generally CIVIL PRACTCCE, supra note 34, 1 4503.07, at 45-122.
52 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 503(d)(3), Commentary. The exception should
also be applicable to clients with common interests who have engaged separate lawyers.
See id. § 503(b) (3). By requiring a lawyer to inform joint clients of the exception in order
for it to become operative, the Proposed Code avoids the incongruity noted by Judge
Weinstein and Professor Berger in PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. §§ 503(b)(3) and 503(d)(5).
See WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 1, 503(b)[06], at 503-61.
CIVI PRACTICE, supra note 34, 4503.07, at 45-122 to 45-125.
PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 503(d)(3), Commentary.
' See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (29A) § 242 (McKinney 1975) (" 'law guardian' refers to
an attorney admitted to practice law ... and designated under this part to represent
minors . . . [under] this act").
58 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 503(d)(4).
51 N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 4504(b) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
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leges, 5  which deny those privileges if the patient or client is
under sixteen years of age and the information indicates that the
child has been the victim of a crime.59
Another new exception concerns communications between
government lawyers and their officer or agency clients. This ex-
ception, in section 503(d)(5), disallows the privilege unless dis-
closure will hurt the public interest by "seriously impair[ing]"
the functioning of the agency or officer in a pending matter.60
This section must be read in conjunction with the privilege for
official information set forth in section 509(b). e1 Section 509 pro-
vides that communications to and between public employees are
privileged only if the necessity for confidentiality outweighs the
need for disclosure.6 2 The premise underlying the official infor-
mation privilege seems to be that public business should be pub-
lic knowledge unless this interest in the free flow of information
is outweighed by the need for confidentiality.63 Without the ex-
ception, however, a question would arise whether to treat com-
munications to government lawyers as official information under
section 509, where the presumption is in favor of disclosure, or
as attorney-client communications under section 503, where the
presumption is in favor of confidentiality. The exception re-
solves the matter by indicating that ordinarily communications
between public officers or agencies and their lawyers will be
treated as official information under section 509. When, how-
ever, the communication concerns a pending investigation and
disclosure would "seriously impair" the government's ability to
' N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 4508(3) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
See also N.Y. FAi. CT. AcT § 1046(a)(vii) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1932).
6o PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 503(d)(5); see id., Commentary.
61 See notes 62-63 and accompanying text infra.
62 An example of a situation in which the need for confidentiality outweighed the
need for disclosure arose with respect to the records of the McKay Commission's investi-
gation of the Atica uprising. See Fischer v. Citizens Comm., 72 Misc. 2d 595, 339
N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sup. Ct. Wyoming County 1973). The court determined that confidential-
ity had to be ensured if executive department investigations were to be carried out suc-
cessfully. Id. at 601, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 859. See also Langert v. Tenney, 5 App. Div. 2d
586, 173 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1st Dep't 1958).
The public interest in disclosure rests on two foundations. The first is the interest
in the fair administration of justice and resolution of disputes, which requires a properly
limited governmental privilege lest the public confidence in the courts' ability to promote
this goal will be weakened. The second is society's interist in inhibiting future govern-
mental abuses by exposing past wrongful acts. See Note, Discovery of Government Doc-
uments and the Official Information Privilege, 76 CoLu. L. REv. 142, 143 (1976).
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vindicate the public's interest, the communication will be pro-
tected under the attorney-client privilege.
The final exception in section 503(d) denies the privilege af-
ter the client is deceased to communications relevant to prop-
erty transfers by the client.6 The exception presumes that the
deceased would favor expedient disposition of the estate over
preserving the confidentiality of communications made to his at-
torney. 5 This exception goes somewhat beyond the comparable
provisions of the CPLR: they are limited to actions involving
wills and they preclude disclosure of confidential communica-
tions that would "tend to disgrace the memory of the
decedent." 6
II. PATIENT'S PRIVILEGES
While the patient's privileges embodied in the Proposed
Code6 7 appear at first blush to differ significantly from existing
rules, the differences are primarily in form. Very few patient's
privilege cases will be decided differently under the Proposed
Code, should it be enacted, than they would have been under
the CPLR.
The CPLR grants two statutory privileges to patients. The
firsts prohibits disclosure of information acquired while "at-
tending a patient in a professional capacity."" This privilege in-
" PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 503(d)(6). The consultants, who drafted the
Code, stated that the "client's presumable lack of interest in preserving confidences at
the cost of frustrating his intentions regarding the disposition of his property" justifies
denying the privilege. Id., Commentary.
"Id.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4503(b) (McKinney 1963).
" PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 504. Section 504(a)(1) defines a patient as "a
person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a psychotherapist, physician, den-
tist, or nurse." Id. § 504(a)(1).
" N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 4504(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). Section 4504(a) pro-
vides in pertinent part:
Unless the patient waives the privilege, a person authorized to practice
medicine, registered professional nursing, licensed practical nursing, or den-
tistry shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired in
attending a patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to en-
able him to act in that capacity.
Id.
69 Id. Privileged information includes information received from the patient, from
others who are with him at the time of the treatment, or information derived from obser-
vation and examination of the patient. Edington v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 185,
194 (1876); CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 34, § 4504.08, at 45-194. The information must be
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cludes communications with doctors, nurses, and dentists.2 0 The
second protects confidential communications between psycholo-
gist and "client" in the same manner as attorney-client commu-
nications.7' Both the medical and psychological privileges are
subject to numerous statutory and judge-made exceptions2 2 The
most significant of the current exceptions-those requiring dis-
closure of information obtained during an examination under
court order 3 and requiring disclosure when the patient puts his
condition in issue 74-are retained in the Code. 8
The Proposed Code also contains a doctor-patient privilege
and a privilege for psychotherapist-patient communications. Un-
like the CPLR, however, the Code draws the distinction not on
essential to the doctor for purposes of professional treatment or diagnosis, PaCmuRDSON,
supra note 22, § 433, at 425, and extends to information acquired as a necessary incident
of his treatment of a patient for an unrelated condition as well Nelson v. Village of
Oneida, 156 N.Y. 219, 50 N.E. 802 (1898). Any knowledge or facts which can be plainly
seen or readily obtained by a layman are not encompassed within the privilege. Thus, the
physician may testify as to dates of visits, fees paid, and dates of operations. IbCHiD-
SON, supra note 22, § 432, at 424; Civr PRACTICE, supra note 34, S 4504.03, at 45-193.
7 See PRoPosED CODE, supra note 4, § 504(a)(6).
71 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4507 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). Section 4507 provides
in relevant part- "The confidential... communications between a psychologist... and
his client are placed on the same bases as those provided by law between attorney and
client ... Id.
72 E.g., Perry v. Fiumano, 61 App. Div. 2d 512, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382 (4th Dep't 1978);
Jansons v. Jansons, 45 Misc. 2d 795, 257 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. Ct Queens County 1965);
Matter of Allen, 24 Misc. 2d 763, 204 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Sup. CL New York County 1960);
N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. LAw § 4504(b) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); id. § 4504(c); N.Y. CRnxL
PRoc. LAW § 60.55 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y. MmAL Hyc. LW § 33.13 (Mc-
Kinney 1978); N.Y. PuB. HEmTH LAW § 3373 (MeKinney 1977); N.Y. Soc. SuRv. Low §
384-b(3)(h) (McKinney Supp. 1980-81). See generally RiciADSoN, supra note 22, §§
442, 444, at 434-37.
7 See People ex rel. Chitty v. Fitzgerald, 40 Misc. 2d 966, 244 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1963); Milano v. State, 44 Misc. 2d 290, 253 N.Y.S.2d 662 (CL CL
1964). An examination made under court order involves an arms-length relationship be-
tween the doctor and patient in which treatment is not the prime concern. Thus, disclo-
sure of a communication made during the examination is not likely to threaten the type
of voluntary therapeutic relationship the privilege is designed to protect. PRoPosD
CODE, supra note 4, § 504, Commentary.
74 See, e.g., People v. AI-Kanani, 33 N.Y.2d 260, 307 N.E.2d 43, 351 N.Y.S.2d 969
(1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 916 (1974); Koump v. Smith, 25 N.Y.2d 287, 250 N.E.2d
857, 303 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1969); Florida v. Axelson, 80 Misc. 2d 419, 363 N.Y.S.2d 200
(Sup. Ct. New York County 1974). The exception to the privilege when the party puts
his condition in issue is designed to protect against "unfairnes3 to opposing parties" and
the abuse which could result if a party could "inject his condition into the litigation" and
yet claim the privilege. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 504(d)(3), Commentary.
75 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 504(d)(2), (3).
1981]
HeinOnline  -- 47 Brook. L. Rev.  1351 1980-1981
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
the basis of the professional being consulted, but rather on the
basis of the condition for which the consultation was sought.7 1
This choice may be traced in large part to lessons learned from
the experience with the proposed federal rule of evidence 504. 7
The rationale underlying the federal proposal, which would have
eliminated the doctor-patient privilege but accorded a privilege
to communications with psychotherapists, 78 was the traditional
instrumental notion that privileges should be granted only when
necessary to encourage desirable communications. 79 Both com-
mon sense and the absence of a doctor-patient privilege in al-
most one-third of the states" suggested to the federal Advisory
Committee that communications essential for diagnosis or treat-
ment of physical conditions are not deterred by the lack of a
privilege." On the other hand, the assurance of confidentiality
was deemed to be essential for effective communications with a
psychotherapist, since without such assurance those in need
would be less likely to seek this professional service.82
The drafters of New York's Proposed Code agreed with
their federal counterparts on the desirability of the psychothera-
pist privilege. Regarding the traditional doctor-patient privilege,
76 Compare id. § 504(b)(1) with id. § 504(b)(2). See notes 84-86 & 96-101 and ac-
companying text infra.
77 PRoPosED FED. R. Evm. § 504 (1969).
76 Id.
7, Id., Advisory Comm. Notes. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra; Ber-
ger, Commentary- The Privileges Article in the New York Code of Evidence, 47 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 1405 (1981).
SO See Wigmore, supra note 27, § 2380, at 818-827 n.5.
' The federal advisors found no necessity for a privilege for communications relat-
ing only to diagnosis and treatment of physical conditions. Regardless of the logic of the
advisory committee's position, their decision provoked a chorus of opposition to pro-
posed rule 504 from organized interest groups. These groups claimed among other things
that elimination of the privilege would hinder the physician's ability to assist a patient
who would be inhibited from freely discussing medical problems; that the distinction
between psychotherapists and other healing practitioners is artificial in light of the inter-
relationship of mental and physical symptoms; and that elimination of the privilege
would adversely affect less affluent patients who often use general practitioners as surro-
gate psychotherapists. 2 WmNSTmN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 1, 1 504[2], at 504-11, 504-12.
In addition, there was protest from others who felt, even if they could not articulate why,
that the proposed rule simply omitted "something important." See id. at 504-12.
S1 PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. § 504, Advisory Comm. Note. See Yaron v. Yaron, 83
Misc. 2d 276, 278, 372 N.Y.S.2d 518, 519-20 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1975). The
testimonial privilege does not, however, necessarily absolve the psychiatrist of a duty to
warn either victims or authorities of threatened harm. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the
Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
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however, they recognized that although communications neces-
sary for medical treatment might not be deterred by the lack of
a privilege, the traditional privilege served another societal in-
terest, protecting individual dignity and privacy.83
The problem for the consultants was to draft a provision
that was not overly broads' and that would neither become rid-
dled with judge-made exceptions nor become susceptible to use
as an instrument of fraud. The solution adopted was two-fold:
first, section 504(b)(1) extends a privilege for all communica-
tions with a psychotherapist, in recognition of the importance of
confidentiality in the treatment of mental and emotional disor-
ders;" second, because confidentiality is not required to induce
communication in treating physical conditions, section 504(b)(2)
shields from disclosure only those communications which would
tend to subject a patient to "embarrassment, humiliation, or dis-
grace.""8 Information protected under the latter provision would
include, for example, disclosure of venereal disease or, in some
instances, abortion.
83 See PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 504, Commentary, notes 66-69 & 82 and
accompanying text supra. Upon reflection, it appears that the deficiencies of the present
doctor-patient privilege under the CPLR spring from its being broader than necessary to
accomplish its instrumental purpose of encouraging communications and its symbolic
purpose of protecting privacy. To the extent that this is true, the rule has invited statu-
tory and judicial exceptions. See note 72 supra.
", Originally, the physician-patient privilege was liberally construed. See Edington
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 185 (1876); CnvL PRACTICE, supra note 34, t 4504.02, at
45-179 to 45-180. As a result, parties attempted to use it to obstruct rather than enhance
the administration of justice. C. McCoriucK, supra note 29, at 228. Consequently, judi-
cial exceptions were developed to attempt to curtail the fraudulent activity. CIVIL PRAc-
TIc=E, supra note 34, 4504.
" PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 504(b)(1). Section 504(b)(1) provides
A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person
from disclosing confidential communications, made in the course of and for the
purpose of diagnosing, treating, or conducting scientific research on his mental
or emotional condition, among the patient, the psychotherapist, and persons,
including members of the patient's family, participating in the diagnosis or
treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist.
Id.
" Id. § 504(b)(2). This formulation protects the patient's legitimate interest in pri-
vacy, while generally affording the courts access to needed evidence. Id., Commentary; 8
J. WIGMORE, supra note 27, § 2380(a), at 82(a). Cf. Lefkowitz v. Women's Pavillion, Inc.,
66 Misc. 2d 743, 745, 321 N.Y.S.2d 963, 965 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1971) (in an
investigation of alleged fraudulent practices by abortion referral agencies by the Attor-
ney General, court did not require agencies to comply with the request for names of
individual clients and participating doctors).
1981]
HeinOnline  -- 47 Brook. L. Rev.  1353 1980-1981
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
The differing theoretical bases for the two patient's privi-
leges also affect the periods during which the privileges may be
claimed. The privilege for statements regarding mental or emo-
tional conditions may be claimed even after the patient's death;
but since a deceased patient can no longer suffer "embarrass-
ment, humiliation, or disgrace," the privilege for communica-
tions concerning physical conditions ceases at his death.87
In addition to the limitation concerning the scope of privi-
leged communications regarding physical conditions, the Code
departs in three significant ways from current law: (1) there is
no exception for communications regarding the patient's inten-
tion to commit a crime or fraud; (2) there is only a very limited
exception to the privilege in involuntary commitment proceed-
ings; and (3) the conditions for termination of the privilege upon
the death of the patient have been modified.
First, the Proposed Code protects communications to a psy-
chotherapist that indicate an intention to commit a crime or
fraud.88 This is in marked contrast to the current psychologist
privilege 9 and the current" and proposed attorney-client privi-
leges.9 1 The underlying assumptions of the distinction made by
the Proposed Code are that a person disclosing criminal plans to
an attorney is attempting to gain the assistance of someone ca-
pable of concealing or furthering the criminal plans - a situa-
tion society will not tolerate92 - but, disclosure of criminal
plans to a health care professional is usually a conscious or un-
conscious plea for help in relieving an emotional disfunction,
made to a person who can provide professional assistance and
who is ordinarily unable to assist the criminal purpose.93 To the
a7 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 504(b)(2). Although the deceased client of a psy-
chotherapist cannot himself suffer any "embarrassment, humiliation or disgrace," the
decision not to terminate the psychotherapist privilege upon the patient's death, id. §
504(c), is a sound one. Clearly, when a patient's communications to the psychotherapist
concern members of his family, the failure to guard against disclosure, even after death,
might discourage the patient from seeking necessary treatment. But see- notes 98-104 and
accompanying text infra.
"s See PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 504(d), Commentary.
89 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 4507 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981), which is modeled after
the attorney-client privilege in § 4503, provides that a communication to a psychothera-
pist evidencing an intent to commit a crime is not protected.90 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4503(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
9' PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 503(d)(1).
9" Id., Commentary.
93 See 2 WEINSTrN's EVIDENCE, supra note 1, 504[05], at 504-24 to 504-25. It has
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extent that society seeks to encourage verbal resolution of
problems before they become problems of conduct, it must be
willing to keep these communications confidential.
The second major change effected by the Proposed Code is
to provide that the patient privilege may be claimed in involun-
tary commitment proceedings." The exceptions under section
504(d)(1) and (2) apply only to certain examinations required
under the New York Mental Hygiene Law" and examinations
ordered by the court."" Thus, examinations by the patient's own
therapist will be privileged in involuntary commitment proceed-
ings. When a patient has made communications with an expec-
tation of confidentiality, paternalistic notions should not be used
to justify breaching the trust invested in the therapist.s
been suggested, however, that because a psychiatrist cannot be certain of his client's
future actions, a statutory duty should be imposed upon the doctor to discldoe to author-
ities information obtained from the client concerning future crimes. Note, Psychiatrist
Patient Privielge - A Need for the Retention of the Future Crime Exceptions, 52 IowA
L. REv. 1170, 1182-86 (1967). The California Evidence Code includes such an exception.
CAL. Evm. CODE § 1018 (West 1966). See also Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif.,
17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (court held that psychotherapist
had a duty to warn the intended victim whom his patient had expessed an intention to
kill).
94 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 504(d)(1), Commentary, explains-
To allow a psychotherapist to testify at [a commitment] proceeding regarding
communications from the patient would be a serious breach of the confidence
the patient has placed in the therapist. The possibility of interference with the
patient's freedom that is posed by such proceedings calls for scrupulous safe-
guarding of his interests. No matter how benevolently motivated, all who seek
confinement of the patient should be treated as adversaries with interests an-
tagonistic to his.
9" PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 504(d)(1). Section 504(d)(1) "does not include a
general exception for hospitalization proceedings." Id., Commentary. See N.Y. MmvrAL
HYG. LAw, § 23.07 (McKinney 1976).
"PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 504(d)(2). Section 504(d)(2) is consistent with
current New York law which accepts "at least implicitly that no privilege will attach to
results of an examination ordered by the court." Id., Commentary (citing People ex reL
Chitty v. Fitzgerald, 40 Misc. 2d 966, 244 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. CL Kings County 1963);
Milano v. State, 44 Misc. 2d 290, 253 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Ct. CL 1964)). The privilege does
apply to communications made to a psychiatrist appointed by the court to assist defense
counsel in evaluating the case. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 504(d)(2), Commentary.
See CAL. Ev. CODE, § 1017 (West Supp. 1980).
"See note 92 and accompanying text supra. The New York consultants' position is
not uniformly accepted. The federal advisors balanced the needs and interests of the
patient and the public differently in a commitment proceeding, and concluded that con-
fidentiality need not be maintained. Since proposed federal rule 504 authorized disclo-
sure "[o]nly when the psychotherapist determines that hospitalization is needed, control
over disclosure [would be] placed largely in the hands of a person in whom the patient
13551981]
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The final major change and clarification accomplished by
section 504 of the Proposed Code is the provision extinguishing
the privilege after the death of the patient when "any party re-
lies upon the [patient's] condition as an element of a claim or
defense."9 8 This provision appears to differ from CPLR 4504(c)
in two respects. First, the current provision generally permits
waiver only by representatives of the decedent and parties
claiming under him.99 Under proposed section 504(d)(3), 'the
privilege is waived if any party relies upon the subject of the
communication. Second, the limitation in the current statute
precluding waiver if the content of the communication would
"tend to disgrace the memory of the decedent" 00 is omitted
from the Proposed Code. Reading section 504(d)(3) in conjunc-
tion with section 504(b) suggests that the only communications
likely to be protected against disclosure after the patient's death
are statements to his psychotherapist offered to impeach the pa-
tient's hearsay declarations in cases in which the patient's
mental condition is not in issue. 0 1 This result is very close to
that reached by the New York Court of Appeals in Prink v.
Rockefeller Center, Inc., °2 a wrongful death action brought af-
ter the plaintiff's decedent fell from the window of an office
building. The plaintiff claimed negligence in the architectural
design of the building and in its maintenance; the defendants
asserted that the decedent had been acutely depressed, implying
that he had committed suicide. 03 In their attempt to prove that
has already manifested confidence. Hence, damage to the relationship [would be] un-
likely." PROPOSED FED. R. EvID., § 504(d)(1) (1969), Advisory Comm. notes. See also
Goldstein & Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: The GAP Proposal and the Connecti-
cut Statute, 36 CoNN. B.J. 175, 186-87 (1962).
98 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 504(d)(3). "After the patient's death the need for
relevant evidence outweighs the small likelihood that patients would be deterred from
speaking freely by the possiblity of post-death disclosure." Id., Commentary. See note 87
and accompanying text supra.
99 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4504(c) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
100 Id. Because of the subjective nature of the determination, this CPLR provision is
difficult to apply. Adding to the difficulty, the provision affords the trial judge no discre.
tion; he must exclude any matter which meets the definition even if the exclusion com-
pletely frustrates the interests of justice. N.Y.S. Judicial Conference, Nineteenth Annual
Report app. D., at A50-51 (1973); CIVM PRACICE, supra note 34, 1 4504.20, at 45-229 to
45-230.
'"x PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 806, Commentary.
102 48 N.Y.2d 309, 398 N.E.2d 517, 422 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1979).
103 Id. at 313, 398 N.E.2d at 519, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
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the death resulted from a suicide and not from their negligence,
the defendants sought disclosure of the decedents conversations
with his wife and his psychiatrist. The court held that the plain-
tiff could be required to disclose the conversations between the
decedent and his psychiatrist, on the ground that she had placed
the decedent's mental condition in issue by bringing a wrongful
death action in which suicide was a substantial possibility.2"'
The result under the Proposed Code would be the same, al-
though accomplished more directly.
I. SOCIAL WORKER-CLIENT PRVILEGE
Recognizing, apparently, that social workers often function
as "the poor man's psychiatrist,"10 5 the consultants drafted the
social worker-client privilege to track the provisions of the pa-
tient-psychotherapist privilege.10 8 Specifically, this has meant a
change from the CPLR provision that "a certified social worker
... shall not be required to treat as confidential a communica-
tion by a client which reveals the contemplation of a crime or
harmful act.' 107 Proposed section 511(c) denies the social worker
this discretion, and accords privileged status to communications
in contemplation of a crime or harmful act. 08 Once again, the
judgment was made that actual harm will be less frequent if
people are encouraged to talk out, rather than act out, contem-
plated criminal activity.109 Of course, the existence of a testimo-
0 Id. at 317, 398 N.E.2d at 522, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 916. Prior to Prink, the New York
rule was that the privilege was waived only when the party claiming it had affirmatively
put his condition in issue, not when the condition was raised by the opposing party.
Koump v. Smith, 25 N.Y.2d 287, 294-95, 300, 250 N.E.2d 857, 861, 864, 303 N.YS.2d
858, 864-65, 869 (1969); CIVIL PRAMCEc., supra note 34, 3121.01, at 31-389; Id. S 4504.15,
at 45-220 to 45-223.
105 See PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 511, Commentary.
106 Compare PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 511, with id. § 504. The current statu-
tory provision, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1931), is ambiguous
as to whether the privilege is discretionary with the social worker. The general statement
of the privilege reads that the social worker "shall not be required to dicloze" the confi-
dential communication. Id. This suggests that the privilege is to be claimed or waived by
the social worker. See generally 5 CirL PRAcmcE, supra note 34, t 4503.01, at 45-253.
The Proposed Code eliminates the ambiguity by making it clear that the privilege is
waivable only by the client. PROPOSED COon, supra note 4, § 511.
107 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 4508(2) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981) (emphasis added).
' PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 511(c).
'11 See notes 77-82 and accompanying text supra. See generally Commentary,
Under-privileged Communications: Extension of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
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nial provision does not automatically absolve the social worker
of a duty to warn authorities or intended victims of the threat of
harm-that question has been left for case-law resolution.110
IV. SPOUSAL PRIVILEGES
Current New York law contains two types of spousal privi-
leges: (1) two rules of testimonial incompetence, one statutory
and one common law; and (2) a statutory rule of privilege for
confidential marital communications. CPLR 4502(a) provides
that one spouse is incompetent "to testify against the other in
an action founded on adultery." ' A similar judge-made rule
holds a spouse incompetent "to testify to non-access during
wedlock, if the testimony would render a child illegitimate. '1 112
Both of these incompetency provisions will be abrogated with
the adoption of the Proposed Code.1
The privilege for confidential marital communications in
CPLR 4502(b) is intended to give some protection to the mar-
riage relationship. 11 4 It therefore applies only to communications
which would not have been made but for the confidence of that
to Patients of Psychiatric Social Workers, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1050 (1973).
110 See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 442, 551 P.2d 334,
347, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 27 (1976).
"I N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4502(a) (McKinney 1963). The CPLR also provides three
exceptions to the rule: the spouse may testify to "prove the marriage, disprove the adul-
tery, or disprove a defense after evidence has been introduced tending to prove such
defense." Id. This provision, which by its terms is a rule of competence rather than a
privilege, was designed to make divorces difficult to obtain, in furtherance of the policy
of preserving marriages. See Report of the N.Y. Joint Leg. Comm. on Matrimonial and
Family Laws, 113-16 (1957). In light of the recent liberalization of the New York divorce
law, see N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1977), § 4502 is an anachronism. CIVIL
PRACTICE, supra note 34, % 4502.02, at 45-61 to 45-62. See PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4,
8 505, Commentary.
12 Chamberlain v. People, 23 N.Y. 85 (1861). The non-access rule was originally
rooted in principles of "decency" and "morality" and the public policy against "bastard-
izing" a child. See Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257. (1777); RICHARD-
SON, supra note 27, § 446, at 439; CIVIL PRAcTIcE, supra note 34, 1 4502.09, at 45-69 to
45-70. Application of this rule has been restricted by the Family Court Act, which allows
non-access testimony to be given in support and filiation proceedings. N.Y. FAM, CT. ACT
(29A) §§ 436, 531 (McKinney 1975).
113 When § 505 is read in conjunction with § 601, the general competency provision
of the Proposed Code, the testimonial privilege based upon the marriage relationship will
be eliminated. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 505, Commentary. See Lewin, Article VI
of the New York Proposed Code of Evidence, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1303 (1981).
24 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 505(b), Commentary.
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relationship. 115 Section 505 of the Proposed Code retains this
privilege without any significant change from the CPLR.11
As drafted, the marital privilege under section 505 would
seem to dictate a result contrary to the decision reached in
Prink v. Rockefeller Center, Inc.,"7 which was discussed in con-
nection with patient's privileges. By a four-to-three margin, the
New York Court of Appeals held in Prink that communications
between the plaintiff and her deceased husband regarding his
emotional state and his visits to a psychiatrist were not privi-
leged.' The majority treated the privilege as having been
waived by the commencement of the wrongful death action. It
supported this conclusion by balancing the limited utility of the
privilege in encouraging spousal communications against the po-
tential unfairness to adversaries when the evidence is
withheld." 9
Dissenting in part, Chief Judge Cooke12 0 articulated the ra-
tionale against withdrawing the privilege: the legislative judg-
ment embodied in the statue "expresses the long-standing social
policy that the injury to domestic harmony and marital privacy
occasioned by the unrestricted search for relevant information is
too great to endure.' 21 As the Chief Judge noted, the Legisla-
'" As in N.Y. Civ. PRc. LAW § 4502(b) (McKinney 1963), the marital communica-
tions privilege of § 505 of the Proposed Code applies both to civil and criminal proceed-
ings; the consultants rejected the idea of limiting the privilege to criminal case3. Pno-
POSED CODE, supra note 4, § 505(b), Commentary. Traditionally, the privilege ha3 been,
and continues in the Proposed Code to be, considered esential to the preervation of the
marital relationship. Id. (citing Mercer v. State, 40 Fla. 216, 226, 24 So. 154, 157 (1893)).
In addition, the consultants noted that the constitutional right of privacy may mandate
the privilege. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 151 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965)). See note 123 and accompanying text infra.
116 N.Y. Cv. PRAc. LAW § 4502(b) (McKinney 1963).
217 48 N.Y.2d 309, 398 N.E.2d 517, 422 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1979).
118 Id. at 316, 398 N.E.2d at 521, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 318 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting in part).
121 Id. at 320-21 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting in part). The Cooke analysis was approved
by Tuoky, CPLR 4502(b): Spousal Privilege Waived by Commencement of Wrongful
Death Action, 54 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 409 (1980). The author was particularly disturbed
by the court's substitution of its judgment for that of the legislature in determining that
"the better policy" was to hold that the spousal privilege had been waived by commence-
ment of the lawsuit Id. at 413. Although the author did not dispute the authority of the
legislature to provide for waiver under such circumstances, it was reasoned that since the
legislature had not imposed any restrictions upon when the privilege could be invoked, it
was not proper for the court to do so through judicial reinterpretation of the policies
underlying the privilege. Id. at 413-15. Because it was prepared prior to the PHnh deci-
1981]
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ture had already considered the value of the privilege and the
potential unfairness to opposing litigants and had struck the
balance in favor of the privilege.1 2
Section 505 of the Proposed Code, consistently with the ar-
gument of the dissenters in Prink, acknowledges that "continued
support rather than abandonment of interspousal privilege is en-
dorsed by the psychological and sociological human need for
someone in whom to confide and the growing recognition of the
constitutional right of privacy. 1 23
V. PRIVILEGE FOR COMMUNICATIONS TO CLERGY
The privilege for communications to members of the clergy
set forth in section 506124 virtually restates current law.123 The
only change is a broadening of the availability of the privilege to
cases in which the court finds that the communicant "reasonably
believed" that the confidant was a member of the clergy.120 For a
communication to be "confidential" under the Proposed Code, it
must be "made privately and not intended for further disclosure
except to other persons present in furtherance of the purpose
of the communication. ' 127 Thus, the presence of a lay parish
worker assisting the clergyman during the communication will
sion, the Commentary to § 505 is silent on the impact of the new law enunciated in
Prink. It is arguable that the reenactment of the spousal privilege without any specific
indication that the privilege can be asserted only defensively could be viewed as legisla-
tive repudiation of the Prink holding.
122 48 N.Y.2d at 321, 398 N.E.2d at 524, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
123 Id. at 322, 398 N.E.2d at 525, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
124 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 506. Section 506 defines "member of the clergy"
as "a minister, priest, rabbi, accredited Christian Science practitioner, or other similar
functionary of a religious organization, or an individual reasonably believed so to be by
the person consulting him." Id. The Commentary to this section indicates that the refer-
ence to the three major religious groups was designed to exclude members of "fringe
cults." Id., Commentary. On the other hand, the definition, by including a reference to"similar functionar[ies]" is designed to be broad enough to include anyone who may
legitimately claim the designation "clergyman." The difficult question of who will qualify
in the final analysis as a "member of the clergy" has been left for the courts to consider.
The issue is one that has constitutional overtones, since a denial of the privilege for
communications to ministers of any group might be "considered an unconstitutional cur-
tailment of freedom of religion." Id.
2 See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4505 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
126 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 506(a)(1). Whether the claimant of the privilege
had a "reasonable" belief that the confidant was a "member of the clergy" is a prelimi-
nary question of fact for the judge's determination. See id. § 104(a).
127 Id. § 506(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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not cause the privilege to be lost.128
Section 506 continues to protect communications even if
they were not required to be made by the tenets of the relig-
ion.129 So long as the communication is made to a member of the
clergy acting in his professional capacity as a spiritual advisor,
the communication will be privileged. 30 Thus, the privilege may
apply to communications made during some marital and other
personal counseling, as well as to penitential communications.1 31
VI. POLITICAL VOTE
Section 507 of the Proposed Code is a restatement of ex-
isting law, that a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose his
vote in a political election, unless he voted illegally."2 As the
Commentary to the Proposed Code notes, the privilege is justi-
fied as "an essential concomitant of the secret ballot."1 33
VII. TRADE SECRETS, OFFICIAL NFORMATION, AND IDENTITY OF
INFORMER
Section 508 dealing with trade secrets, 34 section 509 dealing
with official information, 35 and section 510 dealing with inform-
128 Id. See 2 WENsrEm's EVIDENCE, supra note 1, T 506[03], at 506-12.
129 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 506. See Krugllkov v. Kruglikov, 29 Misc. 2d 17,
217 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1961), appeal dismissed, 16 App. Div. 2d 735,
226 N.Y.S.2d 931 (4th Dep't 1962); RICHAmDSON, supra note 22, § 425, at 418. The pur-
pose of extending the privilege to non-required communications is to encourage commu-
nications to members of the clergy in their role as counselors. Pnorosu CODz, supra
note 4, § 506, Commentary. See id. § 504; id. § 511.
110 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 506(b).
131 Id., Commentary.
132 Id. § 507 provides: "Every person has a privilege to refuse to disclose the tenor of
his vote at a political election conducted by secret ballot unlecs the vote was cast
illegally."
1 Id. § 507, Commentary. See N.Y. CONST. art. 2, § 7; N.Y. ELEc. Lw §§ 7-202, 3-
300 (McKinney 1978).
114 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 508 provides:
A person has a privilege, which may be claimed by him or his agent or
employee, to refuse to disclose and to prevent other persons from disclosing a
trade secret owned by him, if the allowance of the privilege will not tend to
conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice. When disclosure is directed, the
judge shall take such protective measures as the interests of the holder of the
privilege and of the parties and the furtherance of justice may require.
See notes 138-40 and accompanying text infra.
'35 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 509. Section 509(b) provides in pertinent part:
"When [official] information is claimed to be privileged by the government, the court
19811
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ant's identity"'6 set forth privileges which, unlike those previ-
ously discussed, are not absolute but qualified. Accordingly, in
determining the availability of these privileges, the court must
in each case weigh the necessity for disclosure against the need
for confidentiality.1 37 Thus, trade secrets 3 8 are protected from
disclosure unless nondisclosure would tend to conceal fraud or
work injustice."' If disclosure is ordered - as, for example,
when the plaintiff needs to know the composition of a product
that has caused his injury - the court may take appropriate
steps to limit the disclosure, such as taking testimony in camera
or placing those present under oath not to make further
disclosure.140
The official information privilege in section 509,141 which es-
sentially restates the common law,1 42 also requires a balancing of
interests. Here the test is whether the "necessity for preserving
the confidentiality of the information. . . outweighs the neces-
sity for disclosure in the interests of justice. 14 ' This section also
provides that when the court upholds a claim of privilege,
shall determine whether there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the in-
formation that outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice." Id. See
notes 141-52 and accompanying text infra.
:36 See notes 154-69 and accompanying text infra.
137 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, §§ 508, 509(b), 510(b)(2)(3).
,38 The Proposed Code does not define "trade secrets." See generally 2 WEINSTmIN'S
EVIDENCE, supra note 1, 1 508[03], at 508-9 ("both policy and logic suggest a broad con-
cept [of trade secrets] including all business data which gives a better competitive posi-
tion and whose value is substantially enhanced by secrecy.").
'39 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 508. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 27,
§ 2212, at 155-59.
:40 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 508.
41 Id. § 509. Subdivision (a) provides for recognition of federally-created govern-
mental privileges which under the United States Constitution must be given recognition
in state courts. Id. § 509(a). The provision is superfluous because under the federal
supremacy clause federal privileges must prevail over the Proposed Code. U.S. CONST.
art. VI. See Berger, How the Privilege for Governmental Information Met Its Water-
gate, 25 CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 747, 771-83 (1975).
12 See People v. Keating, 286 App. Div. 150, 141 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1st Dep't 1955)
(counsel for private anti-crime committee held in contempt of court for refusing to di-
vulge information; privilege unavailable since counsel was not acting in the capacity of a
public official); Fischer v. Citizens Comm., 72 Misc. 2d 595, 339 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sup. Ct.
Wyoming County) (records and files of the New York State Commission on Attica held
privileged), afl'd, 42 App. Div. 2d 692 (1973).
143 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 509(b). See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 12 (1953); United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946); United States
v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944); 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 1, 1
509[10], at 509-70 to 509-71.
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thereby depriving a party of material evidence, remedies such as
striking the testimony of a witness or dismissing the action may
be in order, "as justice requires."14'
Section 509 raises questions as to its relation to New York
State's Freedom of Information Law (FOIL).'" FOIL provides
for public access to legislative and agency records with the ex-
ception of those "specifically exempted from disclosure by state
or federal statue.1 46 The New York Court of Appeals, in Cirale
v. 80 Pine Street Corp.,"7 held that FOIL did not 'abolish" the
common law official information privilege. 4 8 Subsequently,
FOIL was amended 41'8 and a later interpretation of the relation-
ship between the privilege and FOIL by the Court of Appeals in
Doolan v. BOCES 50 indicated that FOIL, both as originally en-
acted and as amended, was at least intended to be a significant
limitation on the common law official information privilege.""
The Commentary accompanying the Proposed Code sug-
gests that material privileged under section 509 would come
within the FOIL exception for materials specifically exempted
by statute, and would thus be immune from compelled disclo-
sure under FOIL.152 While it is questionable whether such a
broad reading of FOIL's "specifically exempted" language was
intended, 153 it is clear that such an interpretation would allow
244 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 509(c).
145 N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAw §§ 84-90 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
.46 Id. § 87(2)(a).
7 35 N.Y.2d 113, 316 N.E.2d 301, 359 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1974).
148 Id. at 117 n.1, 316 N.E.2d at 303 n.1, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 4 n.1.
149 1977 N.Y. LAws, ch. 933 (repealing and replacing 1974 N.Y. Lws ch. 578) (cur-
rent version at N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW §§ 84-90 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1931)).
150 48 N.Y.2d 341, 398 N.E.2d 533, 422 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1979).
15- Id. at 347, 398 N.E.2d at 537, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 931. The court stated that "[tihe
public policy concerning governmental disclosure is fixed by the Freedom of Information
Law, the common-law official interest privilege cannot protect from disclosure materials
which that law requires to be disclosed .... Nothing said in Cirale v. 80 Pine St. Corp.
was intended to suggest otherwise." Id. (citations omitted).
"' PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 509, Commentary.
"3 The compatibility of FOIL with § 509 depends upon the meaning of the term"specifically" in the context of FOIL's exception for materials "specifically exempted" by
statute. See N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAw § 87(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1931). It is arguable
that the term places a substantive restriction on the scope of the exception, in that the
materials exempted by statute must be "specifically" defined. See Barber, Codification
of Government Privileges in New York. Official Information and Identity of Informers,
44 ALa. L. REv. 279, 285 (1980). Alternatively, the term could refer to the mere fact that
an exemption is statutorily created. This is the position taken by the consultants. See
PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 509, Commentary. In view of the courts' villingness to
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substantially more assertions of confidentiality under FOIL than
are presently possible. This ambiguity ought to be resolved prior
to adoption of the Proposed Code.
The identity of the informer provision of section 510 is the
third privilege rule to which a balancing test must be applied.
The general provision of this rule affords the state a privilege to
protect the identity of a person who has furnished information
in the investigation or prosecution of a crime. 15 4 Section 510(b)
then enumerates three situations in which the privilege is inap-
plicable and the identity of an informer in a criminal matter
must be disclosed. -First, the subsection creates an absolute rule
of disclosure when the informer appears as a prosecution wit-
ness, or when the informer or the authorities have already dis-
closed his identity to the accused, his associates, or, in the artful
words of the statute, to "those who would have cause to resent
the communication." '155
Determining the applicability of the informer privilege in
the two other situations in which disclosure may be ordered
turns on the purposes for which the testimony is sought. In a
pretrial suppression hearing, when the court is dissatisfied with
the corroboration of the informer's information or doubts the
existence or reliability of the informer, section 510(b)(3) autho-
rizes the judge to require disclosure of the informer's identity.""
Disclosure in this case ordinarily is not made to the defendant,
but will be in camera, in the presence of the prosecutor and his
witnesses.5 7 This procedure, which protects the informer against
apply the exception even when the exempted material constitutes a general category, see,
e.g., Fitzpatrick v. County of Nassau, 83 Misc. 2d 884, 372 N.Y.S.2d 939 (Sup. Ct. Nas-
sau County 1975) (exemptions for lawyer's work product, material prepared for litigation
and privileged material deemed "specific" enough to fall within FOIL's exception), af'd,
53 App. Div. 2d 628, 385 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1976), the view expressed in the commentary
appears to be the more reasonable one.
'54 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 510. The identity of a person who had aided in a
legislative or administrative investigation is treated as a matter of official information
governed by § 509. Id. § 509, Commentary.
' Id. § 510(b)(1). The language was taken verbatim from PROPOSED FED. R. Evio.
510(b) (1969). PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 510(b)(1), Commentary.
'56 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 510(b)(3).
157 Id. When sufficient indication of probable cause exists apart from the informer's
tip, disclosure of the informer's identity is not necessary and these proceedings need not
be instigated. This does not preclude, however, the use of the unidentified informer's
information at trial. People v. Cerrato, 24 N.Y.2d 1, 246 N.E.2d 501, 298 N.Y.S.2d 688
(dictum), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 940 (1969).
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retaliation and the prosecutor against interference in on-going
and future investigations, follows the procedure fashioned by the
New York Court of Appeals in People v. Darden. 3
Different considerations may prevail at the time of trial.
The Proposed Code recognizes the accused's constitutional right
to know the informer's identity"5 if it appears that the informer
may be able to give testimony "necessary to a fair determination
of guilt or innocence."160 Therefore, when the defendant can
show a factual basis for his belief that the informer's testimony
can help him, he may move for disclosure; the prosecution will
then be given an opportunity to show whether the informer can
in fact supply the exculpatory testimony the defendant seeks. 1 '
The prosecution's showing will ordinarily be by affidavit, with
neither party nor counsel present, but when affidavits prove in-
sufficient, the court may direct that testimony be taken.1 2 The
Proposed Code suggests that in this event also defendant and
his counsel cannot participate in person. Finally, if the judge de-
termines that the informer probably can provide the necessary
testimony, and if the prosecutor fails to produce the informer,
the charges shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant.0 3
The above provisions represent several departures from the
current law. Under the Proposed Code, the prosecution has the
burden of showing whether the informer can supply the testi-
mony sought by the defendant, but according to People v. Jen-
kins"" the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that
the informant can help him.'" Secondly, the Proposed Code's
1 34 N.Y.2d 177, 181, 313 N.E.2d 49, 52, 356 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585-86 (1974).
119 See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 510(b)(2).
161 Id.
262 Id.
163 Id. See text and accompanying notes 164-69 infra.
1- 41 N.Y.2d 307, 360 N.E.2d 1288, 392 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1977).
165 Id. at 309, 360 N.E.2d at 1289, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 588. In Jenhins, the informer
disappeared after the prosecutor had relinquished control over her. The court reasoned
that rather than immediately penalizing the prosecution for something beyond its con-
trol, the interests of justice would be better served by first requiring the defendant to
demonstrate affirmatively that "the proposed testimony of the informant would tend to
be exculpatory or would create a reasonable doubt as to the reliability of the prozecu-
tion's case either through direct examination or impeachment." Id. at 310-11, 360 N.E.2d
at 1290, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 589. Only after this was demonstrated would the prooecution ba
forced to choose between producing the informer and suffering a dismisal of the
charges. Id. at 310, 360 N.E.2d at 1290, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 559. Accord, People v. Maneiro,
1981]
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exclusion of the defendant and his counsel from personal partic-
ipation when the court hears the testimony on the need for the
informer's production runs contrary to the statement of the New
York Court of Appeals in People v. Goggins,16 which held that
such a determination should "not be resolved in an ex parte
proceeding."167 Finally, the dismissal provision of the Proposed
Code, which incorporates only a "fairness test, r"6 8 differs from
the Jenkins holding that when the informant is not reasonably
available, the defendant in seeking dismissal must show that the
informant's testimony would exculpate him or at least produce a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.169
VIII. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sections 512-514 set out general rules applicable to all the
privileges granted by Article V of the Proposed Code. These pro-
visions are not necessarily intended to govern privileges derived
from sources other than the Code;17 0 different policies behind
the non-Code privileges may make the general provisions inap-
propriate to them.
Section 512 governs waiver of privilege by voluntary disclo-
sure. It continues existing law17 1 by providing that the holder of
49 N.Y.2d 769, 426 N.Y.S.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 176 (1980); People v. Canales, 75 App. Div.
2d 875, 427 N.Y.S.2d 879 (2d Dep't 1980); People v. Taylor, 98 Misc. 2d 163, 413
N.Y.S.2d 571 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1979). The Jenkins court noted that even
when the prosecutor knew or should have known that the informer's testimony would be
material to the defense, and had intentionally procured the informer's absence or exerted
inadequate efforts to locate him, the defendant cannot secure a dismissal until he has
proved that the informer's testimony would tend to be exculpatory or to produce a rea-
sonable doubt as to guilt. 41 N.Y.2d at 312, 360 N.E.2d at 1291, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 590. The
court was silent as to who has the burden of proving the prosecutor's lack of due dili-
gence in producing the informer.
166 34 N.Y.2d 163, 313 N.E.2d 41, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012
(1974).
167 Id. at 168, 313 N.E.2d at 44, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
" See PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 510(b)(2).
109 41 N.Y.2d at 312, 360 N.E.2d at 1291, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 590. See PROPOSED CODE,
supra note 4, § 510(b), Commentary. See generally Barker, supra note 153, at 289.
170 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3101(c) (McKinney 1970) (work product of at-
torney not available); id. § 3101(d) (expert's opinion not obtainable); id. § 4501 (compe.
tent witness not required to incriminate himself); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1980-1981) (persons employed with the news media cannot be held in
contempt for refusing to disclose information gathered in their professional capacity).
7 See People v. Bloom, 193 N.Y. 1, 85 N.E. 824 (1908); McKinney v. Grand St.
P.P. & F.R. Co., 104 N.Y. 352, 10 N.E. 544 (1877). See generally J. WMoRE, supra note
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a privilege waives it if he "voluntarily discloses or consents to
disclosure of any significant part of the privileged communica-
tion or matter."'1 72 Thus, if a client voluntarily tells another per-
son the contents of a communication the client had with his law-
yer, 173 or if the prosecutor chooses to identify publicly an
informer, 7 4 the privileges are waived. Existing law regarding
waiver is changed, however, in two respects. The privilege is pre-
served when the voluntary disclosure is made subject to an ex-
press limitation as to its use. 17 15 For example, a party may make
a limited disclosure of privileged information in the course of
settlement negotiations in order to expedite them, and yet retain
the privilege for all other purposes.17 ' The second change re-
vokes the judge-made rule which deems a disclosure on cross-
examination to have been involuntary and therefore ineffective
as a waiver.'7 Under section 513, involuntary disclosure occurs
only when the privilege holder was not given an opportunity to
assert his privilege before the disclosure,17 8 or when disclosure
has been "compelled erroneously" over a claim of privilege. 1 7
Thus, a holder being cross-examined who wishes to retain a priv-
ilege for a confidential matter must affirmatively claim the privi-
lege or suffer its loss.180
27, § 2327, at 634.
'72 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 512.
173 See People v. Farmer, 194 N.Y. 251, 87 N.E. 457 (1909).
174 PRoPosED CODE, supra note 4, § 510(b)(1).
15 Id. § 512.
178 See International Business Mach. Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10 (D.
DeL 1968). A privilege-holder may not invoke the selective waiver provision with impu-
nity. If the frequency of the limited waivers, or the breadth of the disclosure made, ne-
gates the holder's intention to maintain confidentiality, the court should disregard the
expressed limitation and treat the privilege as waived for all purposes. Cf. Duplan Corp.
v. Deering Miliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1161-62 (D.S.C. 1974) (client's voluntary
disclosure of some privileged documents without limitation results in waiver of all privi-
leged communications between the same attorney and client with regard to the Fame
subject matter).
177 See Hughes v. Kackas, 3 App. Div. 2d 402, 161 N.Y.S.2d 541 (3d Dep't 1957);
Kaufman v. Rosenshine, 97 App. Div. 514, 90 N.Y.S. 205 (1st Dep't 1904).
178 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 513 ("A claim of privilege is not defeated by a
disclosure which was (1) compelled erroneously or (2) made without opportunity to claim
the privilege. .. .. ). The Commentary explains that subdivision (2) "becomes operative
when the holder of the privilege ... is not present to assert it ... and a person entitled
to claim the privilege on the holder's behalf fails to do so." Id., Commentary.
1279 Id. § 513.
211 This requirement is made explicit in the commentary, PnoPosED CODE, supra
note 4, § 512, Commentary, but this may also be inferred from the Code itself. Section
1981]
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The final section of the article, section 514, makes a sub-
stantial change in current law.181 This section provides that no
comment may be made upon nor inference drawn from a claim
of privilege."8 2 The reasoning behind this section is that if com-
ment and inference were allowed, the purposes served by ex-
tending the privileges in the first place would be undermined. 18
An adverse comment or inference, like disclosure, would tend to
discourage the original communication or impair the privilege-
holder's privacy."8 4
It is important to note - since the section as drafted does
not make the point clear - that section 514 applies only to the
privileges granted by Article V. Thus, the section does not alter
the comment and inference rules applicable, for example, to the
self-incrimination privilege. Under the United States Constitu-
tion18 5 and the New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), 8 0 a
513 specifically defines those circumstances in which disclosure will be deemed involun-
tary, and hence, when a privilege will be deemed not to have been waived. During cross-
examination the holder of the privilege obviously has an opportunity to claim it, so fail-
ure to do so will automatically result in waiver unless he has been erroneously compelled
by the court to disclose the privileged information. Id. § 513.
181 Id. § 514. Existing New York case-law allows comment upon and inference from
the claim of any privilege in a civil case. Marine Midland Bank v. Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 31,
405 N.E.2d 205, 427 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1980) (self-incrimination); Bradley v. O'Hare, 2 App.
Div. 2d 436, 156 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1st Dep't 1956) (self-incrimination); Deutschmann v.
Third Ave. R.R., 87 App. Div. 503, 84 N.Y.S. 887 (1st Dep't 1903) (physician-patient).
Comment upon and inference from a defendant's assertion of his privilege against self-
incrimination in a criminal case is precluded by statute. N.Y. CraM. PROc. LAW §§
60.15(2), 300.10(2) (McKinney 1981 & McKinney 1971). See notes 154-55 and accompa-
nying text supra. Otherwise, comment upon and inference from a claim of privilege are
permissible in a criminal case. See RICHARDSON, supra note 22, § 457, at 447-48.
182 PROPOSED CODE, supra note 4, § 514(a) provides in part: "The claim of a privi-
lege, whether in the present proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not a proper subject
of comment by the court or counsel. No inference may be drawn therefrom."
183 Under current law, the judicial rationale for not prohibiting comment upon and
inference from a claim of an Article V-type privilege stems not so much from policy
considerations as from an interpretation of legislative intent. In Deutschmann v. Third
Ave. R.R., 87 App. Div. 503, 84 N.Y.S. 887 (1st Dep't 1903), the court approved comment
upon the claim of doctor-patient privilege, reasoning that because the legislature had
specifically prohibited comment only in respect of the self-incrimination privilege claims
in criminal cases, the legislature must have intended for comment otherwise to be per-
mitted. Id. at 514, 84 N.Y.S. at 895. It might be noted that most of the situations in
which comment and inference have been permitted are ones in which no privilege would
be allowed under the Proposed Code. Compare, e.g., Deutschmann, supra with PRO-
POSED CODE, supra note 4, § 504(d)(3).
184 See 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 1, 513[02], at 513-14.
185 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself. . . .").
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criminal defendant's claim of the self-incrimination privilege
may not be the subject of comment or inference,8 7 but assertion
of the privilege by any other witness in a criminal case or by any
witness in a civil case may be.' 8
The Article V privileges and the self-incrimination privilege
require different treatment with respect to comment and infer-
ence in light of the different policies each privilege is designed to
serve. The policy of the self-incrimination privilege is to protect
a criminal defendant from being compelled to give testimony
that might tend to show that he had committed a crime.'80 If
adverse comment and inference on the criminal defendant's
claim of privilege were not barred, they would produce the same
result as compelled testimony, thereby negating the defendant's
fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself.1°0 If, however,
the person claiming the privilege in a criminal case is a witness
other than the defendant, adverse comment upon the claim of
privilege in that case will not impair the witness' self-incrimina-
tion right because the witness is not at risk of conviction
thereby.' 9' If the person claiming the privilege is a party or non-
party witness in a civil case, the policy informing the privilege
will not be impaired by adverse comment or inference in that
186 N.Y. CRmi. PRoc. LAw §§ 60.15(2), 300.10(2) (McKinney 1931 & McKinney
1971).
18"7See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
People v. Hetenyi, 304 N.Y. 80, 106 N.E.2d 20 (1952); People v. Lea%itt, 301 N.Y. 113, 92
N.E.2d 915 (1950); In re Cohen, 9 App. Div. 2d 436, 195 N.Y.S.2d 990 (2d Dep't), off'd, 7
N.Y.2d 488, 166 N.E.2d 672, 199 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1959), alfd, 366 U.S. 117 (1961); People
v. Maimone, 9 App. Div. 2d 780, 193 N.Y.S.2d 90 (2d Dep't 1959).8 See note 182 supra.
189 See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
190 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
191 See C. McCoRLUCK, supra note 29, § 120, at 255. It may be reasonable, neverthe-
less, to bar comment and inference in this situation as well, on the grounds that com-
ment about the witness' claim may put undue pressure on the defendant to tahe the
stand or that any adverse inference against the defendant is not justified as a matter of
relevancy. In United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1959), the Second
Circuit endorsed a general prohibition against inference from or comment upon a wit-
ness' assertion of a privilege against self-incrimination even when the inferences were
very persuasive. The Supreme Court later ruled that inference from or comment upon a
witness' assertion of the self-incrimination privilege is reversible error only where the
government makes a conscious and flagrant attempt to build its case upon such infer-
ences or where the witness' refusal to testify adds critical weight to the prozecution's
case in a form not subject to cross-examination. Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179
(1963). In United States v. Aiken, 373 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1967), the Second Circuit modi-
fied its position to conform to the Supreme Court's mandate.
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case because no conviction can result. Therefore, relevant com-
ments and inferences in civil cases are permitted. 1 2
On the other hand, the underlying purposes of the Article V
communications privileges (at least those of section 503 (attor-
ney-client), section 504 (patients' privileges), section 505 (hus-
band-wife), section 506 (clergy-penitent) and section 511 (social
worker-client)) are to encourage the communications and to pro-
tect privacy. No matter the status of the witness or the type of
case in which the privilege is claimed, adverse comments and in-
ferences will retard the furtherance of those goals. Thus, if peo-
ple speaking in confidence expect that juries will be allowed and
even encouraged to speculate on the contents of their conversa-
tions, they will be dissuaded from making the communications
in the first instance. In any event, if comment and inference are
permitted, the resulting jury speculation will be a legally sanc-
tioned invasion of privacy.19 3 Accordingly, section 514 bars all
adverse comments upon and inferences from a claim of an Arti-
cle V privilege.
CONCLUSION
The privileges article of the New York Proposed Code of
Evidence is a conservative, rather than a reformist, codification.
It largely restates traditional New York law, and thus tends to
follow Wigmorean principles. Some tentative steps have been
taken toward recognizing the interests of privacy and dignity,
but these steps reflect developments already forged by the
courts and legislature. One might argue that excessive deference
has been paid to corporate and governmental interests at the ex-
pense of those of individuals (in sections 508 and 509, respec-
tively), and even that traditional privileges, such as attorney-cli-
ent, ought to be qualified rather than absolute, if privacy rather
than instrumental interests are paramount. The consultants ap-
parently believed that the time was not yet ripe for shifting the
theoretical bases supporting the privileges. It will be interesting
to see whether they correctly judged the temper of the
legislature. r
12 Marine Midland Bank v. Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 31, 42, 405 N.E.2d 205, 211, 427
N.Y.S.2d 961, 967 (1980).
I' Cf. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965) (distinguishing between in-
ferences a jury might make on its own and those encouraged by the court.)
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